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Economic Consequences of the Peace…Social Consequences of the War
Keynes’s Economic Consequences of the Peace   -- brilliant, unfair, wrongheaded, 
destructive perhaps in its consequences…but right for the wrong reasons.  After ninety 
years it remains perhaps the most successful published polemic of the twentieth century 
-- thrown off in white heat in the summer and fall of 1919 by an author whose major 
work seventeen years later, The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money, 
would brilliantly overthrow one economic orthodoxy and, for a generation at least, 
prepare the way for another.
Ultimately Keynes was dealing with a topic that he did not acknowledge in his title: the 
economic consequences of the war, the disruption of the economic exchanges and 
commerce of that pre-1914 globalized world that he evokes with brilliance in chapter 1.  
The war had demonstrated that politics or at least the passions of nationalism trumped 
economic reasoning, and that is why politics, although Keynes may have lamented the 
fact, tended to come first at the peace conference.  The commitment to resurrect a Polish 
nation-state with a Baltic coastal outlet meant the creation of a state that had to cost 
Germany traditional Prussian territories.  Self-determination in the Baltic and the former 
Habsburg realms meant the creation of fragile and weaker nations.  The inability to 
suppress the Bolsheviks and/or the unwillingness to appease them, meant a tremendous 
ambiguity about Russia’s role in post-1918 Europe.  But Keynes understood that the 
tragedy came not only in l9l8 but l9l4.  
Skidelsky’s brilliant biography makes clear how Keynes and his liberal British 
intelligentsia lived in a world of transnational culture that they hardly wanted disrupted, 
but gradually saw destroyed.1   From one perspective the Economic Consequences is a cri 
de coeur against the destruction of that world.  Keynes served his government during the 
war, but he never abandoned his cosmopolitanism and his hope for a compromise that 
might repair the continent.  What he lamented in his tract was that the statesmen of l9l9 
could not finally overcome that rupture.
The part of the book that often seems to have captured most attention comprised the 
character sketches.  With the exception of his mother – so Skidelsky reports -- his readers 
loved these clever portraits.  They carried on his friend Strachey’s tradition in Eminent 
Victorians.  To Keynes the traits he described explained why the settlement was so 
flawed:  Lloyd George, too clever by half, calling for heavy German obligations, then 
repenting of his demagogy;  Wilson, caught up in Presbyterian rectitude and 
representative of a crass material culture whose politicians could not see beyond their 
local interest; and Clemenceau: single-minded cynic intent on subjugating Germany.  2
These merciless sketches (and ultimately Keynes self-censored the one on Lloyd George 
and removed it from his book) play a curious role in his tract.  One has the sense that they 
were inserted to make a supposedly dull subject interesting to a culture that was most 
likely to tolerate political economy only when sugared by biography.  They showed he 
could master “fine writing.”  Had Keynes been less determined to be an appealing 
writer,he might have reflected that the traits he had sport in identifying were the ones that 
had brought their countries through desperate straits: providing the ruthlessness needed to 
keep Britain and France so single-mindedly through the terrible years of l917-18, and 
allowing Wilson the moral fervor finally to enlist his countrymen in a far-away cause.  
Did Keynes really believe that the Treaty of Versailles was adversely affected by the fact, 
as he saw it, that Woodrow Wilson’s hands, “though capable and fairly strong, were 
wanting in sensitivity and finesse”?  (p.25)  Wilson “had no plan, no scheme, no 
constructive ideas whatever for clothing with the flesh of life the commandments which 
he had thundered from the White House.” (27)  This was just rhetorical nonsense:  
defective though the results might have been, the League of Nations and the construction 
of nation-states in Eastern Europe followed Wilsonian precepts.  
As for Clemenceau, who kept his hands gloved throughout (Keynes remains fascinated 
by hands!) he could not be accused of naiveté or lack of comprehension.  Keynes is more 
on the mark.  For Clemenceau the natural state of Franco-German relations had to be 
implicit if not explicit war, and thus the task was to reduce German power, including 
economic power.  “By loss of territory and other measures her population was to be 
curtailed: but chiefly the economic system, upon which she depended for her new 
strength, the vast fabric built upon iron, coal, and transport must be destroyed.”  (p.22) 
Keynes’s argument is that this attitude had to lead inexorably to the “Carthaginian 
Peace.”  And here is where the book gains force, namely in Keynes’s argument  that the 
Carthaginian peace “is not practically right or possible…The clock cannot be set back.  
You cannot restore Central Europe to 1870 without setting up such strains in the 
European structure and letting loose such human and spiritual forces as, pushing beyond 
frontiers and races, will overwhelm not only you and your ‘guarantees’, but your 
institutions, and the existing order of your society.” (p.23)
This was a serious argument.  Keynes devotes the heart of his book to showing how the 
Allies were working toward this perilous end.  His tract first discussed all the diminutions 
of German territory and population, the removal of coal resources, and the handicaps laid 
on a merchant marine – all designed, he suggested, to render Germany an economic 
cripple.  Keynes then proceeds to show second is to show how the reparations settlement 
was not only unjust but unworkable. Here is where historiography of the 1970s found it 
easiest to criticize.  As Keynes himself recognized, British domestic politics in the fall of 
l9l8 was a prime factor in leading to heavy reparations claims.  He at least is unsparing of 
his own countrymen, rashly promising to squeeze the German citrus “until the pips 
squeaked.”  By the time Lloyd George sought to reverse course in the Paris negotiations, 
it was too later.  It was easier to bamboozle Wilson then de-bamboozle him. (p.34)  3
When Keynes wrote, the final reparations bill had not yet been determined, but Keynes 
calculated that the damages that might be charged to Germany would total perhaps 
£3,000 million (=milliard or thousand million) for physical damages and another 5 
£5,000 million for pensions and allowances, or up to £8 thousand million pounds.  In fact 
the reparation bill was to total about £6.6 billion sterling (or close to 3billion dollars or 
132 billion gold marks – the unit of account based on the Mark’s prewar value).  The 
provisions for extracting that sum involved having Germany amortize a series of bonds, 
that would be issued in different series sequentially, but, so Keynes estimated with the 
result that it would require 48 years of payments continually rising to over £3 billion 
pounds or close to 60 billion gold marks per year.  Keynes was “as certain as anything 
can be” that Germany could not pay this sum (pp. 100-105).  Two billion pounds (£2,000 
million =40-50 billion gold marks) represented the upper limit of German capacity to pay 
(pp. 126-127).  
Keynes’s book caused an outcry among Tory and hard-line opinion in Britain; it 
obviously was welcomed in Germany.  Recent historiography has divided.  For many The 
Economic Consequences of the Peace quickly became obvious wisdom.  Keynes had said 
the Germans couldn’t pay, and by and large they didn’t once having made an initial 
payment of a billion gold marks and a contested sum in kind by 1921.  Keynes predicted 
a possible inflation, which followed.  Still, the generation of historians returning to the 
reparation issue about thirty years ago was much more critical.  Stephen Schuker, 
forcefully demonstrated that the Germans evaded making payments they might have 
made.  The opening of French documents allowed a more sympathetic understanding of 
the French position.2  The question became the one that the French had insisted on: not 
what payments were feasible, but what compensation was just.  This author felt more 
critically about Keynes in the l970s and l980s than since.  Subsequent historical work has 
tended to redress the balance and to look less at injustice than short-sightedness.  As 
Keynes understood, forcible extraction of resources from an enemy country was very 
difficult or required a much greater degree of control (such as the Germans had over the 
French from 1940 to 1944, or the Soviets had over the East Germans after 1945).
Of course the heart of the book was the economic argument:  The reparations conflict 
inflamed nationalist opinion in Germany, led the country into a desperate crisis by 1923, 
and then abated.  The supposedly draconian terms levied in 1921 were postponed in 
1924. In fact, the continuing series of different bonds spaced out over time diminished the 
present value of the burden (as Keynes would recognize in 1921) although it appeared 
primarily to prolong it.   The United States banking system played the role from l924 
until 1929 that Keynes had wanted official U.S. policy to play in l9l9:  that is to 
recognize the linkage between German payments to the former allies and their payments 
to the United States.  But when the system of capitalist credits broke down (in fact once it 
came under strain from l927 even before the Crash), reparations were to be wound down 4
again.  They still inflamed Germany and mobilized Nationalists and Nazis together.  But 
agricultural recession, choking markets were the prime cause: reparations would be 
wound up by 1932.  Keynes was right: far better to have avoided that tremendous 
exacerbation of revanchist sentiment in Germany!  Far wiser for America to have moved 
to limit the French-British surenchère of claims in the early months of the conference!
Americans would in effect substitute Marshall Plan payments for German reparations 
after l945, but, not being able to envisage the consequences, were not ready to take on 
that burden after 1919.  Still, by the time the U.S. had negotiated settlements with each of 
its debtor nations in the l920s, it had excused roughly half of the present value of what it 
was nominally owed.  
Keynes said some wise things, but did he write a wise book?  His demonstration was 
bound to encourage German resistance to the reparations and hardly likely to encourage 
the French to accept revision.  Keynes’s analysis impressed because of the supposedly 
scientific weight behind the numbers.  Germany was sacrificing 15 percent of its territory 
and its productive base.  Before the war it had barely balanced its international accounts.  
How on this reduced national territory could it ever create the export surplus needed to 
send payments abroad?  
But this is a curious argumentation.  The Bonn Republic from l949 until l989 achieved its 
formidable economic achievement on a far smaller size than the interwar German 
Republic.  More fundamentally, Keynes virtually dismissed the possibility of economic 
growth.  He understood the argument that Germany was “capable of very great  
productivity,” by which he meant economic growth, and he recognized “that in 1870 no 
man could have predicted Germany’s capacity in 1910.” (pp. 128-29)  Nonetheless, he 
dismissed the potential for growth as having virtually no bearing on the problem.  First, 
he argued, that wartime industrial wear and tear, unfertilized fields, the diminution of 
livestock, the burden of pensions, would preclude recovering the prewar growth rates, as 
estimated by Karl Hellferich (pp. 129-30).  Second he raised the issue of what would 
soon become known as the transfer problem: even assuming growth might resume, how 
could the new capacity be made into a surplus available for export (p.131)?  Some sleight 
of hand emerged in this argument.  Keynes maintained that the possibilities of growth 
should not justify the wilder notions that ultimately she might pay £10 billion pounds – 
but the issue was whether she might eventually pay the sum of about £7 billion, not even 
more exaggerated claims.  And was German economic growth rendered irrelevant by the 
transfer problem?  There would be a huge debate on this issue by the late l920s, but it 
would eventually be demonstrated that budget surpluses could become current account 
surpluses.
What is striking is that Keynes presupposes a Malthusian framework that prewar growth 
belied, indeed one that he himself abandoned when he wrote the essay “Economic 
Possibilities for our Grandchildren,” in l930  with its vision of a future plenty.  Keynes, 
however, was not really a growth economist; his analysis presupposed economic 5
plateaus: plateaus of plenty perhaps, but plateaus nonetheless.  His major work, The 
General Theory of 1936, would focus on restoring an earlier prosperity, not ensuring 
continuous economic growth.  This theoretical challenge was left to his younger 
enthusiastic Anglo-American readers in the late 1930s and 1940s.  
Perhaps because he wished to emphasize the difficulty of extracting reparations, Keynes 
depicted the prewar world economy as a taut and precarious web of relations, which was 
facing Malthusian limits.  “I have selected for emphasis the three or four greatest factors 
of instability,” he writes of 1914:  “the instability of an excessive population dependent 
for its livelihood on a complicated and artificial organization, the psychology instability 
of the labouring and capitalist classes, and the instability of Europe’s claim, coupled with 
the completeness of her dependence, on the food supplies of the New World.” (p.15)  
What a skewed picture this is!  Rather than emphasize what material prosperity had been 
achieved, or how European manufacturing gave her unparalleled command over the 
agrarian products of the world  (which he had conjured up nine pages earlier), he stressed 
Malthusian fragility – a continuing pressure on resource limits.  There was a neurasthenic 
hyperdevelopment to the golden age of 1914.   Moreover, the two resources that were 
most constraining were wheat or food and coal.   The scarcity of food ensures the 
vulnerability to America; the limits on coal ensure the unworkability of the immediate 
German payments.  Keynes assigns a resource determinism to the extraction of coal 
throughout his argumentation.  Keynes could have provided other numbers but he was 
beset by an overriding vision of breakdown and collapse.  I am not claiming he was 
wrong:  the great depression might be said to have shown how well founded was his 
image of fragility.  But the growth in Europe of 1925-29, brief though it was, and 
certainly that after 1945, should lead us to question whether there was not more resilience 
than he chose to depict.
  
Finally, I think, there is another reason behind his Malthusian assumptions.  What 
worried Keynes in l9l9 was the future of capitalism. And of course not only Keynes!  But 
Keynes was concerned because he feared that the war revealed on what a thin moral 
foundation capitalism rested and indeed on what a thin moral foundation he, along with 
Bloomsbury as a whole, believed it merited.  The Economic Consequences of the Peace 
assumes not merely a world of rival national economies.  It suggests that all the European 
nations had an interest in not overburdening a bourgeois order built on great inequality.  
European “society was so framed as to throw a great part of the increased income of the 
class least likely to consume it….Herein lay, in fact, the main justification of the 
capitalist system.” (p.11)  Only by saving the surplus the propertied received rendered 
bourgeois accumulation tolerable and allowed for prosperity.  But this system rested on 
“a double bluff.”  The laboring classes were cajoled or coerced into working so hard for 
relatively little; the propertied classes were convinced of the virtue of saving.  “And so 
the cake increased; but to what end was not clearly contemplated.” (p.12)  The war, 
moreover, might consume the cake – and even if it did not, “The war has disclosed the 
possibility of consumption to all and the vanity of abstinence to many.  Thus the bluff is 6
discovered; the labouring classes may be no longer willing to forgo so largely, and the 
capitalist classes, no longer confident of the future, may seek to enjoy more fully their 
liberties of consumption so long as they last, and thus precipitate the hour of their 
confiscation” (p.13)
Lenin and his enthusiasts lurked in the corridors of history.  The world war, which 
Keynes termed a European civil war (p.2) had already given the Bolsheviks control of 
one huge country.  He had no illusions that their revolution represented any sort of 
progress.  The greatest damage the war had inflicted was not on French and Belgian 
territories, but on the hitherto docile acceptance of class inequality. Could the Europeans 
and the Americans (who were being asked to cancel their financial claims as well) not 
understand a venerable civilization was at stake?  We must read this text finally not as 
just a statistical argument about realistic peacemaking but as a warning about the social 
and cultural order.  We can understand in retrospect that capitalism was more robust than 
his temporarily Malthusian assumptions allowed – it had at least almost a century left to 
thrive. 1 Robert Skidelsky,  John Maynard Keynes, vol. I: Hopes Betrayed 1883-1920 (London: Macmillan, 1983).  
Page references to The Economic Consequences of the Peace are to The Collected Writings of John 
Maynard Keynes, vol. II (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, the Macmillan paperback printing  of 
1984). They will be inserted in brackets directly after the citations.
       
2 See among others Stephen A. Schuker,  The End of French Predominance in Europe:  The Financial 
Crisis of l924 and the adoption of the Dawes Plan (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1976); 
also Schuker,  American “Reparations” to Germany, 1919-33,” (Princeton: Princeton University Economid 
Department); also Marc Trachtenberg,  Reparation in World Politics: France and European Economic 
Diplomacy, 1916-1923 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1980).   For emphases on the difficulty of 
making reparation payments, see  Peter Krüger, “Das Reparationsproblem der Weimarer Republik in 
fragwürdiger Sicht: kritische Überlegungen zur neuesten Forschung,”  Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte, 
29 (1981);  Bruce Kent,  The Spoils of War:  The Politics, Economics and Diplomacy of Reparation 
1918-1922 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989)   Zara Steiner attempts a rapid summary in The Lights 
that Failed:  European International History 1919-1933 Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), pp. 
193-201.  Other contributions by Barry Eichengreen, the late Gerald Feldman, Carl Ludwig Holtfrerich and 
Charles S. Maier, Sally Marks,  have marked this ongoing debate. 